We show that state non-separable preferences à la Epstein-Zin-Weil (EZW) provide a tractable and ‡exible framework to study the economics of health and longevity. This utility representation: (i) admits a preference for timing of resolution of uncertainty regarding mortality risks; (ii) links the marginal valuation of survival to the level of survival; (iii) can preserve homotheticity even for low degrees of intertemporal substitution without generating implausible predictions regarding the value of life; and (iv) adds needed ‡exibility to account for the empirical evidence on the value of life. We illustrate the implications of EZW preferences for the economic value of observed di¤erences in life expectancy across countries and over time, and for the value of life over the life cycle.
INTRODUCTION
The degree of aversion to mortality risk is central to assess the economic value of medical research, as well as health, environmental, and various policy interventions a¤ecting mortality rates. Microfounded dynamic models with mortality risk have become increasingly popular to study issues of health and longevity. Recent examples include Murphy and Topel (2006) and Hall and Jones (2007) , who study the economic value of health improvements and the reasons for the secular increase in health spending in the US; and Becker, Philipson and Soares (2005) and Jones and Klenow (2016) , who estimate the economic gains associated to lower mortality rates around the world. A common feature of this literature is the use of the expected utility model. Although this type of framework is commonly used to analyze a variety of economic issues, it is not clear that it is also desirable to study longevity. This paper discusses properties of preference representations that are desirable to study mortality issues. In particular, we examine the properties of a state non-separable utility representation along the lines proposed by Kreps and Porteus (1978) , Zin (1989, 1991) and Weil (1990) -EZW henceforth. We show that this representation provides a natural, tractable and ‡ex-ible framework to study aversion to mortality risk. By separating risk aversion from intertemporal substitution, the EZW framework displays ‡exibility in four dimensions relevant to the economics of health and longevity: (i) it admits a preference for the timing of resolution of uncertainty regarding mortality risks; (ii) it allows the marginal valuation of survival to depend on the level of survival; (iii) it can preserve homotheticity even for low degrees of intertemporal substitution without generating implausible predictions regarding the value of life; and (iv) it provides superior ‡exibility to match the empirical evidence on the value of life.
First, available empirical and experimental evidence indicates that individuals are not indi¤erent to the timing of the resolution of uncertainty. 1 In the case of mortality risk, studies looking at uptake rates of genetic testing for fatal illnesses show that many individuals choose not to learn the information provided by these tests (Oster et al., 2013) . Related studies report that individuals at risk avoid testing because for them "termination comes not at the moment of death but at the moment of diagnosis" (Wexler, 1979, p. 199) . As Epstein et al. (2013) indicate, given that the information from genetic testing has clear instrumental value, the evidence of low uptake rates is at least suggestive of a negative psychic bene…t of early resolution. The EZW utility model admits a preference for early or late resolution of uncertainty and therefore o¤ers a natural benchmark for studying mortality risk.
Second, the imputed economic bene…t of any intervention that changes mortality rates (e.g. public health, road safety, medical procedures, a peace treaty) depends on whether or not utility is linear in probabilities. Linearity implies that an individual's willingness to pay for the intervention is the same regardless of whether the probability of surviving without it is 5% or 95%. Evidence, however, suggests that non-linearities may be important for the economics of health. For instance, Becker et al. (2007) argue that a decreasing marginal bene…t of survival helps rationalize why the elderly are willing to pay nontrivial amounts to extend their short remaining life span. EZW preferences are generally non-linear in survival probabilities. By breaking linearity, EZW utility allows the marginal valuation of survival to decrease or increase with the level of survival.
Third, a useful model of longevity should provide plausible theoretical predictions regarding the value of life. For the class of (time-and-state separable) expected utility models this generally requires utility to be non-homothetic. Speci…cally, for the most common case in which the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is less than one, imposing a positive minimum consumption level is unavoidable in order to obtain plausible values of life (Murphy and Topel, 2006; Hall and Jones 2007; Jones and Klenow, 2016) . This minimum consumption level is the consumption equivalent of death, or the level at which individuals are indi¤erent between being alive or dead. At least two issues arise when utility is non-homothetic. First, life-or-death gambles would be welfare enhancing because individuals whose consumption is below the minimum would be willing to pay to enter a Russianroulette type of lottery (Rosen, 1988) . But life-or-death gambles in which individuals are willing to pay to participate are hardly observed in practice. Second, non-homotheticity automatically introduces an income e¤ect in the willingness to pay for life, implying particularly low values 1 See Brown and Kim (2014) for a summary of the evidence regarding …nancial risk.
for individuals whose consumption is close to the minimum. In contrast, EZW preferences can easily handle the low intertemporal substitution case while maintaining homotheticity, and without generating implausible predictions regarding the value of life. This is possible because the value of life in EZW preferences is not strongly linked to the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, but to the coe¢ cient of risk aversion. This leads to our last point.
Fourth, accounting for the empirical evidence of the value of life is central when evaluating the economic bene…ts of policies a¤ecting mortality risk. EZW utility o¤ers a more ‡exible framework for this purpose. In particular, EZW preferences are a parsimonious generalization of expected utility, with one more parameter: the coe¢ cient of risk aversion. In the context of the health and longevity literature this parameter is conceptually appealing because it measures the degree of aversion to mortality risk, and is the natural parameter determining the economic value of life.
Relative to prevalent expected utility models, this added ‡exibility diminishes the in ‡uence of nonhomothetic parameters, and facilitates matching the evidence on the value of life for all income levels. In fact, the literature has recognized that an issue with expected utility models is that the size of minimum consumption a¤ects the willingness to pay for life in a non-trivial manner (Murphy and Topel, 2006; Jones and Klenow, 2016) . More importantly, by construction, individuals whose consumption is close to the minimum would exhibit particularly low willingness to pay for life.
However, available evidence on the value of life in poor countries does not support this prediction (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003) .
We illustrate the quantitative predictions of EZW preferences in two di¤erent contexts: comparisons of well-being across countries, and the value of life over the life cycle for the US. Regarding cross-country comparisons, we assess the economic value of longevity changes for the period 1970-2005 in a panel of 144 countries. For this purpose, we calibrate a version of our EZW model that abstracts from life-cycle features. We compare our results to those of Becker et al. (2005) , who analyze an otherwise similar but expected utility model. We …nd that with EZW utility the value of life in poor countries is larger relative to Becker et al. (2005) , while it is similar for richer countries. This is the result of two forces. First, the calibration implies diminishing returns to survival in the EZW model, so all else equal, life is more valuable in countries with shorter life spans. Second, EZW utility dampens the asymmetric e¤ect of minimum consumption on the valuation of life in poor relative to rich countries. For instance, the ratio of value-of-life to income is sharply increasing in income in Becker et al. (2005) because consumption in poorer countries is close to the calibrated minimum. Available cross-country estimates of the value of life in poor countries do not support this sharply increasing pattern (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003) .
We also use the calibrated model to calculate full measures of income that include the gains in longevity between 1970 and 2005. The EZW model penalizes losses and favors gains much more than existing models. Similarly, the EZW model implies that the world dispersion of welfare, which takes into account di¤erences in life expectancy, is larger than the dispersion of incomes. Finally, we assess the welfare e¤ects of positive events like the end of wars and devastating events like the AIDS pandemic. For this purpose we compute full measures of income for 1990 and 2005, the relevant dates for the AIDS epidemic. We again …nd that the economic value of the loss in life due to AIDS and of the gain in life due to the end of wars is signi…cantly higher than previous estimates.
Our second application examines the quantitative implications of EZW preferences for the value of life at di¤erent ages. For this purpose we calibrate a version of the EZW model that includes life-cycle features, and compare our results to those of Murphy and Topel (2006) who perform a similar exercise using a standard expected utility model. We …nd that for the average full-time male worker in the US, the value of life for ages 20 to 40, and after age 80, is higher than what Murphy and Topel (2006) report. The di¤erences arise because individuals have lower income at the beginning and at the end of their life cycle, so consumption at those ages is closer to the minimum, an e¤ect not present in our model. In addition, the calibrated EZW model implies that all else equal, life is more valuable for those with shorter life spans, the elderly. Last, for low-income individuals in the US, the value of life over the whole life cycle is larger under EZW utility than with expected utility. In sum, EZW utility has distinct quantitative predictions for young adults, the elderly, and low-income individuals.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the properties of preferences that are desirable to study longevity issues. Section 3 presents a state non-separable EZW model and derives its implications for the value of life extensions. Section 4 illustrates the quantitative predictions of the EZW model both across countries, and across ages in the US. Section 5 discusses further implications of the analysis, and Section 6 concludes.
PREFERENCES AND MORTALITY RISK
The properties of preferences regarding consumption risk have been studied extensively, but properties associated to mortality risk remain largely unexplored. In order to discuss some of these properties, consider a state non-separable representation of preferences. The parametric class of Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990) is particularly convenient. In fact, while there are other state non-separable speci…cations, EZW utility is one of the most popular departures from expected utility (EU) in macroeconomics. There are various reasons for this popularity: EZW preferences are recursive and time consistent; they are also parsimonious and tractable; and they disentangle intertemporal substitution from risk aversion, concepts that are described by distinct and constant parameters. In addition, standard EU can be easily obtained as a special case of EZW preferences, facilitating the comparison between the two representations.
Consider an individual of age t who consumes z t ( 0) at age t, and survives to age t + 1 with probability t . Assume the utility of remaining life is described by
where 1 > > 0 is a discount factor, 1= is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution ( 0), parameter 0 governs mortality risk aversion, and E t f W t+1 is the expected utility over the life-or-death lottery. Equation (1) is a parametric version of Kreps and Porteus' (1978) preferences proposed by Epstein and Zin (1989) . The separation between and constitutes the main feature of EZW preferences, and EU corresponds to the special case = . Letting W be the individual's perceived utility upon death, we can write equation (1) as
and obtain the EU formulation when = as
Notice that W t is (generally) negative when > 1 and non-negative when 2 [0; 1). The following is a convenient monotonic transformation of (2), also used by Epstein and Zin (1989) , that preserves the preference ordering and guarantees strictly positive utilities. De…ning
which in the case = reduces to
where
0 is the transformed perceived utility upon death. 2 We now discuss four aspects of preferences relevant to issues of mortality risk: (i) the preference for the timing of resolution of uncertainty; (ii) the marginal valuation of survival; (iii) homotheticity with low degree of intertemporal substitution; and (iv) the added ‡exibility useful for empirical purposes.
Preference for the timing of resolution of uncertainty
The thought experiment underlying the notion of preference for timing asks the following question:
"how much would you pay to have your lifetime risk resolved next month, keeping in mind that you cannot use that information" (Epstein et al., 2013, p. 12) . The preference for the timing of resolution of uncertainty refers thus to the "psychic" e¤ects of the resolution, not to the decision value of the information to the individual or to a planning advantage. If actions could be taken after receiving information, even the standard EU model would exhibit a preference for early resolution of uncertainty. But when no actions can be taken, the information revealed upon resolution of uncertainty only has a psychic e¤ect (Strzalecki, 2013) . Kreps and Porteus (1978, Theorem 3) show that agents exhibit a preference for early (late) resolution of uncertainty depending on whether lifetime utility is convex (concave) Many other studies on genetic testing for Huntington's disease also …nd that a sizable portion of the population at risk prefers not to know (Kessler, 1994; van der Steenstraten et al., 1994; Tibben et al., 1993; Yaniv et al., 2004) . Individuals cite as the major reasons to avoid being tested "fear of adverse emotional e¤ects after an unfavorable diagnosis, such as deprivation of hope, life in the role of a patient, obsessive searching for symptoms and inability to support one's spouse" (Yaniv et al. 2004, p. 320) . Wexler (1979) describes the results of 35 interviews with individuals at risk for the disease as follows: "All of the interviewers were painfully aware that the disease is terminal, but for them termination comes not at the moment of death but at the moment of diagnosis. Most fantasize the period following diagnosis to be a prolonged and unproductive wait on death row" (p. 199-220) . Studies of HIV testing avoidance also …nd that many individuals exhibit some type of protective ignorance (Kellerman et al., 2002; Day et al., 2003; Weiser et al., 2006) . For example, Day et al. (2003, p. 665) conclude that the major barriers to voluntary counselling and testing were "fear of testing positive for HIV and the potential consequences, particularly stigmatization, disease and death." 4
The evidence on Huntington's disease supports a preference for late resolution of uncertainty.
Individuals for whom termination comes not at the moment of death, but at the moment of diagnosis, could be rationalized from the perspective of preferences (2) 
Marginal valuation of survival
A salient feature of the EU representation in (3) is that it is linear in survival probabilities. An implication of this linearity is that individuals attach the same value to a given change in survival t regardless of whether the level of t is 5% or 95%. EZW preferences are more ‡exible because they allow for non-linearities in probabilities and therefore can recover a link between the level of survival and its marginal bene…t. Whether survival exhibits increasing or diminishing returns depends on the degree to which consumption can be substituted across states and time. Speci…cally, the marginal rate of substitution between survival and consumption is given by
4 If knowing the cause of death provides information about how painful death may be, then other considerations arise. A painful death may e¤ectively change the consumption allocation of an individual if he/she is unable to enjoy some of that consumption. From this perspective, one has to be careful when interpreting genetic test avoidance evidence. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. Having said this, we think Huntington's disease constitutes a relatively clean case because fear of a painful death has not been cited as one of the major concerns for avoiding genetic testing. 5 The increasing availability of genetic testing opens up the possibility of better documenting the role of preferences for late resolution of uncertainty. While identi…cation is generally very di¢ cult in other contexts, like …nancial risk, the availability of genetic testing provides an interesting opportunity in the case of mortality risk. Identi…cation is still a key issue, but possible depending on the nature of the illness.
This expression shows that the marginal value of survival, or longevity, is positive if and only if Notice how parameters and determine both preferences for the timing of resolution of uncertainty, and the degree of diminishing or increasing returns to survival. For instance, > implies both a preference for late resolution and decreasing marginal value of survival. The intuition for this result is tied to the fact that the e¤ective time discount factor in EZW preferences is 
A diminishing marginal value of survival is obtained in this case because the discount factor increases at a decreasing rate with t . The opposite holds when individuals prefer early resolution: 6 We do not model endogenous health expenditures. A model of health spending with EZW preferences should also include technological progress in medicine, which has been documented to explain the vast majority of health expenditure growth in the US (Chandra and Skinner, 2012) . 7 The marginal rate of substitution in consumption is
Therefore, the implied time discount rate is
for these relatively impatient agents the discount factor increases at an increasing rate with t .
In the case of the elderly, who have a lower survival rate t , an increase in t would raise the discount factor by relatively more if the agent is of the more patient type, one who prefers late resolution. This elderly individual would value the increase in survival relatively more than an otherwise similar but younger individual who has a higher survival rate.
Our analysis of the marginal valuation of survival focuses on the properties of preferences. We do not study the "production" side of mortality risk, where competing risks may create a link between changes of survival and its level. For example, a medical procedure may have a larger e¤ect in reducing the mortality risk of young healthier individuals than of the elderly who are facing multiple health problems. In that case, the marginal rate of transformation would depend on the probability of survival. However, competing risks would suggest that the elderly should be less willing to pay for any particular medical procedure because it a¤ects their survival to a lesser extent. In contrast, our model could explain why the elderly would be willing to pay more for a medical procedure even if it has a small impact on survival.
Homotheticity with low intertemporal substitution
In most quantitative macro models, including those at the intersection between health and macro, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution 1= is less than one (Murphy and Topel, 2006; Hall and Jones 2007; Jones and Klenow, 2016) . In this class of EU models non-homotheticity arises naturally to guarantee that life has a positive bounded value. The non-homotheticity can take the form of a consumption ‡oor or ceiling. In either case, non-homotheticity introduces both theoretical and quantitative issues. This section focuses on the theoretical aspects, while the quantitative aspects are discussed in the next section. An added advantage of EZW preferences is that they can preserve homotheticity even for the case > 1, without generating implausible predictions regarding the value of life.
Consider the EU framework as described in equation (5) when z t = z and t = for all t so that
Let z denote the level of consumption for which V = V so that an individual with permanent consumption z would be indi¤erent between living or dying. Such level is given by z = (1 )
the consumption equivalent of death. Individuals with consumption below z would prefer to die. Notice that it is not possible to avoid the non-homotheticity introduced by z > 0 in EU models when > 1. This is because consumption in this case is essential in all states, so that having z = 0; or V = 0, makes lifetime utility zero V t = V (z; 0) = 0 for all z 0. In addition to not being a useful speci…cation, in this case the price of survival would be in…nite as can be seen from (6) when z = 0 and = . Setting z = 0 is not an issue when 0 < < 1 because V (z; 0) > 0 for all z > 0, so consuming in all states is not essential.
In terms of the more familiar EU representation (3), the essentiality of consumption when > 1 is re ‡ected in the fact that lifetime utility W E t is 1 when z = 0. To see this, notice that using the transformation W = V 1 =(1 ), the case V ! 0 corresponds to W ! 1 when > 1, which results in W E t = 1. 8 To avoid this situation, W > 1 is needed, or equivalently, V > 0. 9 An alternative way to mechanically avoid the non-homotheticity when > 1 would be to set W = 0 in (3), or equivalently z = 1, a consumption ceiling rather than a ‡oor. In this case dying is always better than living regardless of the level of consumption. In fact, the price of survival in equation (6) becomes negative when = > 1 and V = 1 (or W = 0). This is not a very useful model of longevity because it portrays life as a bad rather than a good.
Non-homotheticities may introduce non-convexities in preferences, providing a welfare-improving role to life-or-death lotteries (Rosen, 1988) . Figure 1 illustrates this issue for the EU model when > 1. Turning …rst to panel (a), if there are no lotteries and suicide is possible, then total utility will be non-convex: V suicide (z; V ) = max fV (z; V ); V g. The solution in this case is V for z < z and V (z; V ) for z z, as seen in Figure 1a . The …gure makes clear that non-homotheticity cannot be
with the horizontal axis in Figure 1a ).
Insert Figure 1 around here
The non-convexity of utility gives rise to potential gains through Russian-roulette type of lotteries as illustrated in Figure 1b . Individuals with consumption levels in the range [0; z ], with z > z, would prefer to enter a life-or-death gamble that would pay z in the case of surviving and 0 if not. As noticed by Rosen (1988) , convexi…cation through lotteries guarantees that everyone's welfare is above V so that the economic value of a life is positive for all individuals (z > 0). Notice that in Figure 1b , function V lottery (z; V ) corresponds to the convexi…ed line in the range [0; z ], so that V lottery (0; V ) = V . In addition, V lottery (z; V ) = V (z; V ) when z > z . However, this type of Russian-roulette lotteries in which individuals are willing to pay to participate are hardly observed in reality. To be precise, life-or-death gambles in the form of risky jobs do occur, but individuals require compensation to enter these gambles. What is not typically seen is that individuals pay to enter these gambles. 10 Quantitative applications of EU to mortality questions generally abstract from gambles or suicide, leaving open the possibility that su¢ ciently poor individuals, with consumption below z; 8 In the context of a fertility choice model, Doepke (2005, p. 340) uses this argument to restrict to be between zero and one.
9 Readers may be more familiar with the idea of adding a constant to the utility ‡ow rather than setting W to a negative value (e.g., Hall and Jones, 2007) . Both approaches are equivalent as shown by Rosen (1988) . Subtracting W from both sides of equation (3), one can write
W . In this version, the utility of dying is zero and the positive constant (1 ) W is added to the utility ‡ow.
do not value life nor extra years of life. As we argue in more detail in Sections 3 and 4, the EU literature faces a dilemma when calibrating z; or equivalently V . On the one hand, in the absence of lotteries, a small z is required to minimize the mass of individuals for whom life is a "bad." On the other hand, matching a plausible target for the value of (statistical) life requires a large z for the quantitative relevant case of > 1. 11 An advantage of EZW preferences is that they can avoid non-homotheticity for any value of without implying that life is not valued. This is possible because EZW utility disentangles intertemporal substitution from risk aversion. This point can be seen from equation (4), which we rewrite here for convenience
As seen in this equation, V is raised to the power 1 , not 1 as in EU. This implies that if > 1,
consumption is essential at all times, but not in all states. What governs whether consumption is essential in all states is , the mortality aversion parameter. It is then possible to have > 1
as consistent with most evidence, while at the same time avoid non-convexities by setting V = 0 (z = 0). This requires the restriction 2 (0; 1), one that can be veri…ed quantitatively. With V = 0 all individuals with positive consumption value life. EZW utility can thus eliminate non-convexities and avoid situations when suicide is preferred, while at the same time being consistent with > 1.
This is not possible in the standard EU model.
A possible, if troublesome, interpretation of negative values of life implied by existing quantitative exercises is that they represent cases in which life is not worth living due to extreme poverty, but suicide is costly. 12 Available evidence, however, provides no indication that even at low levels of consumption large numbers of individuals would prefer death to life. For instance, Banerjee and Du ‡o (2007) use household surveys from 13 developing countries to document how the extremely poor live. They …nd that "even the extremely poor do not seem to be as hungry for additional calories as one might expect" (p. 147). In fact, even if it appears the poor could spend more in food than they do, they allocate their spending in other valued nonfood items such as alcohol, tobacco and festivals. More importantly, "while the poor certainly feel poor, their levels of self-reported happiness or self-reported health levels are not particularly low" (p. 150). In a related study in a poor area of rural India, Banerjee et al. (2004) …nd no evidence of great dissatisfaction with life.
Only 9% of those surveyed say their life makes them generally unhappy, a proportion very similar to what is found in the US. In general, life seems to be valued everywhere, even in extremely poor regions. What makes EZW utility more ‡exible than EU is the possibility of setting z = 0 when > 1, so that non-convexities are eliminated and life is valued by all.
Flexibility to match the empirical evidence on the value of life
The marginal rate of substitution between survival and consumption, described in equation (6), measures the willingness of individuals to pay for additional life. This price is a key prediction of the model of particular importance for quantitative purposes. The corresponding price for the EU model, obtained by imposing = in (6), is given by
Since the EU is a special case of EZW, the latter o¤ers more ‡exibility when matching available evidence of the value of life, in particular, the value of statistical life (VSL) as we do in Sections 4
and 5. For given and , the EU model can match a given target for the value of life by setting V properly, while the EZW model has two parameters, V and , to match the target. 13 This is a key advantage of EZW utility because it o¤ers the possibility of choosing a small enough value of death V so that life is valued by all, allowing the mortality aversion parameter to be the main determinant of the value of life. As discussed above, it is even possible to choose V = 0 so that life is valued by anyone with positive consumption. In contrast, under the EU model there is no guarantee that the value of V that matches a plausible target for the VSL is also consistent with all individuals valuing life extension. In fact, as we explain later, the EU model with > 1 faces an unavoidable tension because a low value of V is required to minimize the mass of individuals who do not value life, but as V ! 0 (or z ! 0) the value of life goes to in…nity (see equation (8)).
Matching a target for the value of life using V as in the EU model, or as in with EZW utility has di¤erent economic implications. In particular, the …rst method introduces a non-homothetic element and income e¤ects into the analysis, while the second uses an elasticity with no income e¤ects implications per se. Finally, comparing equations (6) and (8) highlights another advantage of disentangling and . In principle, under EU also captures mortality aversion, playing a role in determining the VSL in (8). But in this case there is no guarantee that the same value of is consistent with the degree of intertemporal substitution estimated in the literature.
In sum, as a generalization of the EU model, EZW preferences make it possible to simultaneously match the imputed consumption upon death z, the degree of intertemporal substitution in consumption (1= ), and the VSL (via ). The fact that this can be achieved while maintaining recursivity, time consistency, and a parsimonious representation suitable for calibration makes EZW preferences appealing.
Related approaches in the longevity literature
Some attempts have been made to overcome the limitations of the time-and-state separable EU in the longevity literature. For instance, Bommier (2006) and Bommier and Villeneuve (2012) consider a modi…cation of EU that relaxes time separability. This is achieved by introducing an endogenous discount factor that alters the computation of the VSL, and implies that preferences exhibit constant absolute risk aversion with respect to the length of life. Despite representing an interesting departure from time-separable EU, these endogenous discounting preferences remain within EU, so the underlying assumption of indi¤erence to the timing of resolving death uncertainty still holds. In addition, the issues we discussed above regarding non-convexities and the need for gambles still apply.
In a recent working paper, Bommier (2014) explores the implications of longevity extension on aggregate wealth accumulation by using the risk-sensitive preferences of Hansen and Sargent (1995) . As with EZW, these preferences also belong to the class introduced by Kreps and Porteus (1978) . In addition to tractability and simplicity, another advantage of our EZW representation relative to Bommier's risk-sensitive utility is that we are able to guarantee preferences are convex by avoiding a minimum consumption level. In Bommier (2014) , as in the rest of the longevity literature, there is a non-convexity in utility when > 1 and the minimum consumption level is a key determinant of the value of life. In this respect, risk-sensitive preferences are subject to the dilemma discussed above, i.e., minimum consumption should be small enough to avoid the need to introduce gambles, but large enough to match a plausible VSL. In contrast, in our model parameter , which governs aversion to mortality risk, is calibrated to match the VSL.
Bommier (2014) favors risk-sensitive preferences because under EZW utility there are instances in which parameter does not rank preferences in terms of risk. While this is generally true, it turns out that the EZW speci…cation with V = 0 is not subject to this limitation. Below we are able to prove this analytically for the case in which t and z t are constant, and V = 0 (see Section 5.2). In this case parameter does order preferences in terms of risk. This is not possible in the most common applications of EZW preferences in …nance.
An alternative literature departs from EU by making di¤erent assumptions about how individuals perceive, or weight, survival probabilities. For instance, Bleichrodt and Eeckhoudt (2006) explore how the way individuals weight the objective survival probabilities a¤ects their willingness to pay for reductions in health risk. The willingness to pay for reductions in health risks is larger when individuals underweight the probability of being in good health, or are pessimistic. This line of research is based on empirical studies showing that the probability weighting function is inverse S-shaped, overweighting small probabilities and underweighting large probabilities. The speci…c way this departs from EU is that the marginal utility of survival does depend on the level of survival. Although interesting, papers in this category do not address the issues of preference for timing of resolution, nor the issue of non-convexities discussed above.
In sum, to the best of our knowledge, ours is the …rst paper to use EZW preferences to study longevity issues. We next study a consumption and saving model with mortality risk and EZW utility. Equation (4) with V = 0 yields,
A STATE NON-SEPARABLE UTILITY MODEL
where the sequential representation is obtained by recursive substitution of V t+s into V t , and S (t; s)
is the probability of surviving from period t to period s de…ned as S (t; s) = Q s 1 j=t j for s > t and S (t; t) = 1. When j = then S (t; s) = s t . As we show in Section 4, calibrations of parameter under two very di¤erent scenarios, one cross-country and the other over the life cycle, indicate that < 1 so that the restriction 2 (0; 1) is not binding. The same holds in Section 5.1 when we allow for V > 0.
Individual' s problem
Consider an individual of age t who survives to age t + 1 with probability t ; and holds initial assets a t . The budget constraint of the individual at age t is given by
where y t = w t (1 l t ) + b t is total income, w t is the wage rate, l t is leisure, b t non-wage income, c t is consumption, I ( t ) (1 + r) 1 is a bond price, and r is the risk free interest rate. Function
with 2 [0; 1] determines the degree of imperfections in annuity markets. The case = 1 corresponds to perfect annuity markets, while = 0 corresponds to no annuity markets.
Individuals are assumed to retire at some exogenous age R. Let z (c t ; l t ) be a composite good consisting of consumption and leisure. The individual's problem is described in recursive form as V t (a t ; t ) = max ct;lt;a t+1
subject to (10) and a natural borrowing limit. The formulation with = resembles Murphy and Topel (2006) . It allows for an exogenous health index fH t g 1 t=0 a¤ecting the quality of life, while f t g 1 t=0 determines the quantity of life.
Optimality conditions
First-order conditions for assets and leisure are given respectively by 15
@z(c t ; l t )=@l t @z(c t ; l t )=@c t = w t for t < R;
while the envelope condition reads
Equation (13) is the standard static labor-leisure choice condition. Using the envelope condition on the optimality condition for assets (12) we obtain the Euler equation for composite consumption
which di¤ers from the standard Euler equation in three ways. First, survival probability t matters in general for (composite) consumption growth unless = and = 1, the standard EU case with perfect annuity markets. In that case t does not enter into the Euler equation because both the marginal cost and the marginal bene…t of saving are proportional to t . As seen in equation (12), with EZW utility the marginal cost of saving is still proportional to t if annuity markets are perfect, but the marginal bene…t is proportional to
(1 )=(1 ) t via the discount factor. This is a key di¤erence between the EZW and EU models, one that has implications for the life-cycle pro…les of consumption and leisure. For instance, if > , then according to (15) composite consumption growth would tend to be higher than in the EU case because
(1 )=(1 ) t > t . In this case the individual is e¤ectively more patient, or prefers late resolution of uncertainty. Moreover, the e¤ect of higher survival on consumption growth under EZW preferences can be negative, which is not possible under EU. This is the case for example, if annuity markets are perfect and > , or if annuity markets are absent and > 1 > . In both cases
(1 )=(1 ) t =I ( t ) decreases with t .
A second non-standard component in Euler equation (15) is the (gross) growth rate of the quality of life index H t+1 =H t , which a¤ects composite consumption growth. As in Murphy and Topel (2006) , the main role of H t is to help generate a realistic hump-shaped consumption pro…le in the absence of credit market imperfections. In particular, for retired individuals whose leisure is constant, as H t declines when individuals age, consumption also declines and the consumption pro…le exhibits a hump (see Section 4.2 for details). Finally, the last term in the square brackets in (15) is the marginal rate of substitution between c t+1 and c t which is potentially a¤ected by leisure choices.
The value of life
Consider next the willingness to pay for a longer life. In the model, the willingness of an individual of age t to pay for a procedure that increases the chances of survival by t is given by
The envelope condition in (14) provides the expression for @V t (a t ; t )=@a t . Using equations (11) and (10), the marginal utility of survival is given by
The …rst term on the right-hand side is positive: it multiples the utility of being alive at t + 1, V t+1 , by a factor that captures the increase in the e¤ective discount rate due to increased survival.
The second term is negative: an increase in t carries a marginal cost because higher survival increases the price of bonds when annuity markets are present ( > 0). This term disappears from the valuation of life if annuity markets are absent.
The VSL, as de…ned in the literature, is the willingness to pay to save one life by a large pool of identical individuals. Since the overall willingness to pay by a population of size N is N W T P t (a t ; t ), and the number of lives saved by the procedure is N , then the VSL is given by
Thus, the VSL corresponds to the marginal rate of substitution between survival and assets. Using equations (16) and (14) we have that
An alternative way of writing the VSL formula, which allows direct comparison with existing results such as Murphy and Topel (2006) , is given by
where I (t; s) = Q s 1 j=t I ( j ) for s > t and I (t; t) = 1. 16 This expression is similar to (17) but it makes clear that term in brackets is the present value of e¤ ective consumption that would be lost in the event of death. In particular, term z s (@z s =@c s )
1 is composite consumption measured in consumption equivalent units. This "e¤ective" consumption equals actual consumption in the absence of leisure. If the individual is neutral to mortality risk ( = 0) then the value of a life is just the net present value of e¤ective consumption lost in the event of death. Risk aversion ( > 0)
increases the value of a life above the consumption lost and in the limit, as ! 1, the value of life becomes in…nite.
A further simpli…cation can be obtained by substituting optimal savings in the expression.
Forward iteration on the budget constraint (10) allows to write the VSL more compactly as
where v s is the value of a life-year as given by
The VSL can thus be expressed as the present discounted sum of all the future values of a lifeyear, v s . The value of a life-year in (20) has two components: (i) the e¤ective consumption of that year z s (@z(c s ; l s )=@c s ) 1 multiplied by a coe¢ cient describing risk aversion, 1=(1 ); and
(ii) the contingent extra savings from annuity markets upon surviving. Equations (19) or (20) are analogous to the ones derived by Murphy and Topel (2006) for the EU case with perfect annuities.
In fact, the only di¤erence is in the expression of the value of a life-year. Theirs reads 17
where z is the consumption equivalent of death. The comparison between the value of a life-year under EZW utility in (20) and EU in (21) indicates that the only di¤erence between the two is the …rst term, the coe¢ cient adjusting e¤ective consumption. It is 1= (1 ) in the EZW case, and
(1 (z=z s ) 1 )= (1 ) in the EU case. Given its importance in determining the value of life, we call this term the "gross mortality aversion premium", or simply GMAP, de…ned as
The GMAP is the factor by which e¤ective consumption needs to be adjusted to properly re ‡ect the value of a year of life in the absence of annuities. It is a premium if > 1, or a discount if < 1. If > 1 the individual exhibits aversion to mortality risk in the sense that the imputed compensation in the event of death is higher than the lost of e¤ective consumption. In contrast, if < 1 this imputed compensation is below the value of lost consumption. As we review below, and as …rst pointed out by Rosen (1981, p. 243) , "almost all empirical estimates of willingness to pay …nd that it exceeds income" suggesting that > 1 is the empirically relevant case. A feature of the case z > 0 is that the GMAP depends on z s and therefore varies during the life-cycle. One can de…ne an average GMAP as is the ratio of VSL to the present value of remaining e¤ective consumption, both at age t; in the absence of annuities.
The GMAP for the EU case is obtained when = and x = z=z s , while for (homothetic) EZW preferences the GMAP is constant over the life cycle so that t = = 1=(1 ). 18 The following proposition states some properties of the GMAP, which are particularly relevant for the EU case.
Proposition 1. The gross mortality aversion premium (x; ), or GMAP, has the following properties: (i) (0; ) = 1 if > 1 and (0; ) = 1=(1 ) > 1 if 2 (0; 1); (ii) (1; ) = 0; (iii) (z=z; ) 1 if z z 1 1 and (z=z; ) < 1 otherwise; and (iv) x (x; ) < 0.
Part (i) of Proposition 1 shows that the GMAP, and therefore the VSL, can be in…nite. In the EU model this occurs when z = 0 and > 1. Since > 1 is the most common case in macro, then matching a …nite VSL in the EU model requires z > 0. Part (ii) of the proposition states that the GMAP could be as low as zero if consumption in the living and dead states is identical, i.e., z = z. Part (iii) provides a lower bound on z=z in order for GMAP to be larger than 1. For example, if takes the standard value of 1:5 then the GMAP is larger than one if and only if z 2:25 z: These three properties of the GMAP pose a dilemma for EU models. On the one hand, a small z is required to minimize the mass of individuals for whom life is a bad (those with z < z), or those with < 1. But matching a plausible VSL requires a su¢ ciently large z: Moreover, the non-convexity introduced by z > 0 would create arbitrage opportunities for welfare-enhancing life-or-death gambles that are hardly observed in practice. Finally, part (iv) of the proposition implies that the GMAP is a positive function of e¤ective consumption as long as z > 0. Thus, individuals in poor countries, poor individuals in rich countries, as well as the youth and the elderly have a lower GMAP and value their life proportionally less. Section 4 assesses the quantitative importance of these issues using calibrated models. These properties are not an issue for the EZW model because the case of > 1 does not impose any requirement on z being positive or particularly large.
In sum, with EZW utility: (i) life is a good for all individuals since z 0 for everyone; (ii) the GMAP equals 1=(1 ), which is always larger than one, constant during the life cycle, and the same for the poor, the rich, the youth and the elderly; (iii) the value of life is …nite and determined by , not by z; and (iv) arbitrage opportunities for welfare-enhancing life-or-death gambles do not arise.
Perpetual youth model
A special case of the general framework in the previous section is the perpetual youth model: t = ; H t = 1; b t = 0, w t = w, y t = y, z t = c t ; l t = 0 for all t. Assume a 0 = 0 and let z = c be the consumption equivalent of death. The EU version of this model is used by Becker et al. (2005) to compare well-being across countries. Section 4.1 uses the EZW version for a similar purpose. This section uses the perpetual youth model to derive additional results and insights.
The value of life
Under the perpetual youth assumptions, S(t; s) = s t and I(t; s) = I ( ) s t . In this case equation
This equation together with budget constraint (10) and the initial asset condition a 0 = 0, can be used to solve for c 0 as 19
1 9 This is provided that the term in parenthesis is positive. Boundedness conditions are assumed to hold throughout the paper.
Using these two equations together with (19) and (20), the VSL in the perpetual youth model can be written as
Notice that the value of life is generally not time invariant because it is tied to consumption, which can increase or decrease over time depending on parameter values such as the interest rate.
In addition, the e¤ect of mortality on the value of life is rather complex. To gain some further intuition it is useful to consider the special case in which the interest rate is such that optimal consumption is constant, c t = y, and the value of life is constant.
Constant consumption in perpetual youth
Suppose r = r ( ) = I ( ) ( 1)=(1 ) = 1 so that, according to (23), optimal consumption is constant over time. In that case c t = y and (24) simpli…es to V SL(y; ) = (0; )
while the corresponding expression for EU is given by V SL EU (y; ; c) = (c=y; )
Notice that term (I ( ) = ) (r ( ) + 1 I ( )) 1 y is the present value of income. With perfect annuities, equation (26) reduces to V SL EU (y; ; c) = (c=y; ) [y= (r ( ) + 1 )], so the VSL is the present value of income adjusted by the GMAP. The resulting simplicity of the VSL makes transparent some of the earlier …ndings. Of special interest is the VSL-to-income ratio, which is de…ned as (y; ) V SL(y; )=y and EU (y; ; c) V SL EU (y; ; c)=y for EZW and EU respectively. The following proposition summarizes the main theoretical predictions of both models. , so that
which implies that if < (1 ) (1 )=(1 ) then (y; ) > 0. k Proposition 2 draws attention to two di¤erences between EZW utility and EU. First, the behavior of the VSL-to-income ratio is very di¤erent. The ratio (y; ) is independent of income with EZW utility (and V = 0), i.e., although the VSL is larger for higher income individuals, everyone values life in the same proportion to income. The same conclusion would hold in the EU case, but only when < 1 and c = 0. Instead, if > 1 and therefore c > 0, then the non-homotheticity implies that the VSL-to-income ratio is increasing in income under EU. In other words, a higher income individual would value life more than proportionally to his income. The value of life for the poorer individual is proportionally lower because his consumption is closer to the minimum c.
Second, the VSL-to-income ratio is always increasing in the survival probability under EU. In this case the channel is purely discounting: since the discount factor in the EU model is , higher survival raises the VSL relative to income because the future utility is discounted at a lower rate.
The VSL-to-income ratio may be increasing or decreasing in survival under the EZW model. For instance, part (iv) in Proposition 2 implies that 1 > is a su¢ cient condition for this ratio to be increasing in survival. In this case individuals prefer an early resolution of uncertainty, and the elderly, who have lower survival rates, would value life relative to their incomes less than younger individuals. In contrast, if is su¢ ciently close to one, > 1 is a su¢ cient condition for the VSL-to-income ratio to be decreasing in survival. In this case, since > 1 > , individuals prefer a late resolution of uncertainty and older individuals would have a higher VSL-to-income ratio than younger people. 20 The intuition for these results relates to the marginal utility of survival. When individuals prefer late resolution of uncertainty and remaining life is relatively scarce, as is the case for the elderly, then the marginal utility of survival is higher.
Proposition 2 suggests di¤erent qualitative implications for policy design depending on the formulation of preferences. Under EU, health interventions to increase survival probabilities for the younger and the richer would have a higher marginal value. Similar predictions hold for EZW utility if there is preference for early resolution of uncertainty, although the magnitudes would be di¤erent. For instance, a low-income individual who also has relatively low survival rate would have a lower VSL-to-income ratio than a high-income, high-survival individual. However, because 2 0 It can be shown that this result does not depend on the assumption that the interest rate is r = r ( ) = I ( ) of the non-homotheticity of utility, the EU model would predict a lower VSL-to-income ratio for the low-income, low-survival individual than the EZW model.
In contrast, if there is preference for late resolution of uncertainty, health interventions to increase the survival probability of older and poorer individuals would have a higher marginal value because, while the VSL-to-income ratio is independent of income under EZW, income and survival tend to be positively correlated. Individuals who are poor and have low life expectancy, or the elderly, would at the margin value increases in survival the most. In practice, the relevant scenario boils down to whether ? . The following quantitative exercise illuminates this issue
and illustrates the ‡exibility of the EZW framework.
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
This section explores the quantitative implications of EZW preferences for the economics of longevity.
We consider two di¤erent applications. We compare our results with those obtained in Murphy and Topel (2006) for the EU model. How does world inequality look like if we take into account the joint evolution of per-capita income (quality of life) and longevity (quantity of life)? This question is analyzed in Becker et al.
Longevity across countries and over time
(2005) using an EU model of perpetual youth with perfect annuity markets, constant income and consumption, and a constant value of life. The spirit of their exercise is to think of the average individual in a country as receiving the per-capita income y of the country, and facing the constant survival probability implied by the life expectancy T of the country, or = 1 (1=T ).
2 1 Data corresponds to life expectancy at birth from the World Development Indicators for a sample of 144 countries. We use life expectancy at birth, rather than at age 20, in order to compare our results with the literature. In the data, adult life expectancy is less dispersed than expected longevity at birth.
2 2 Per capita income in PPP prices taken from the Penn World Tables Version 7.0.
Calibration
We now calibrate the EU and EZW perpetual youth models of Section 3.2.2 following the methodology of Becker et al. (2005) as closely as possible, so that the only quantitative di¤erences can be traced to the GMAP. Table 1 summarizes the calibration. For both models we exogenously set = 0:97 and = 0:8 for all countries as in Becker et al. (2005) . Countries di¤er in y and in 1970 and 2005. We set the interest rate in each country to 1 + r( ) = ( )=(1 ) = so that consumption equals income y in every period.
Insert Table 1 around here
The key calibration target, one that allows identifying c in the EU model and in the EZW model, is the VSL for the US. Estimations of the VSL are often based on wage di¤erentials across occupations with di¤erent mortality risks, or from market prices for products that reduce fatal injuries. These approaches produce similar estimates of the VSL. To explain this concept, consider a worker who requires an annual premium of $500 per year in order to accept an increase in the annual probability of accidental death of 1=10; 000. In a pool of 10,000 workers, one worker is expected to die and the aggregate compensation for such death is V SL = $500 10; 000 = $5 million. Actual estimates of the VSL in the US range between $4 to $9 million in 2004 dollars for a 40 year old male (Viscusi, 1993; Viscusi and Aldy, 2003) . These estimates have important policy implications and are used for policy evaluations. For instance, the Environmental Protection
Agency has used $6:3 million in cost-bene…t analysis since 1993.
As Table 1 as suggested in Viscusi and Aldy (2003) , then is even lower. In sum, the data supports < .
Last, recall that in this calibration c = 0 in the EZW model. Section 5.1 checks the robustness of the results for c > 0. and therefore negative VSL, implying that the average individual in these countries would prefer to be dead rather than alive, and that convexi…cation through life-or-death lotteries could be welfare improving.
Predicted VSL-to-income ratios

Insert Figure 2 around here
As seen in Figure 2 , the VSL-to-income ratio for EZW utility is always above the EU model, particularly for poorer countries. The ratio (y; ) is mostly ‡at for countries with income percapita above $5,000, around the sample median, and slightly increasing for incomes below this level.
This re ‡ects two facts: …rst, EZW utility is homothetic with V = 0, so conditional on survival, the ratio (y; ) is independent of income; and second, when is not very di¤erent from , the ratio (y; ) is increasing in (Proposition 2). In sum, Figure 2 suggests the crucial role preferences play in studying longevity. The main insight of the …gure is that with EZW utility, the VSL-to-income ratio in poorer countries, particularly those with income per-capita below $10,000, is signi…cantly larger than predicted by the commonly used EU model.
Regarding cross-country evidence on the value of life, Viscusi and Aldy (2003) report the VSL from 21 di¤erent studies around the world published since 1982 (see their Table 4 , p. 27-28).
Countries represented in these studies include richer nations such as Australia, Austria, Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom, and developing economies such as Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, and India. Although this international evidence tends to produce estimates of the VSL that are lower than in the US, the order of magnitude is similar despite the quite di¤erent labor market conditions across these countries. Both the calibrated EU and the EZW utility models predict that in rich countries the VSL is lower than in the US, but of similar order of magnitude.
The main di¤erence between the two models is in the predictions for poorer countries. Consider the case of India, the poorest country included in Viscusi and Aldy (2003) . The most conservative estimate of the VSL in India they report is $1 million. 23 In our calibration, the VSL in India is $75,000 under EU and $168,000 under EZW. Although well below the $1 million estimate, the VSL with EZW is almost twice the one under EU. Two factors explain this di¤erence. First, the VSL in India is lower under EU in part because the GMAP there is lower. Speci…cally, since in India c = $2; 556 in 2005, with c = $526 the GMAP (c=c; ) = 1:36 under EU, while the GMAP (0; ) = 2:46 with EZW. Second, life expectancy at birth in India was 63 years, which implies that the e¤ective discount factor under EU is = 0:955, while with EZW is (1 )=(1 ) = 0:963.
Since according to the calibration late resolution of uncertainty is preferred, then individuals are slightly more patient under EZW, implying a larger VSL.
The benchmark calibration sets = 0:8 < 1 for comparison with Becker et al. (2005) . However, in most quantitative macro studies 1. Figure 2 displays the predictions of EZW utility for a value of close to one ( = 1:01), and for = 1:25, the value used in Murphy and Topel (2006) .
Matching a VSL of $2.9 million in the US with = 1:01 requires = 0:501. In this case, the ratio (y; ) is almost completely ‡at. In fact, equation (25) implies that when is close to one, then the e¤ect of on the VSL is negligible, i.e., regardless of life expectancy, the value of life relative to income is roughly the same across countries. At the other extreme, when = 1:25 > 1, then matching a VSL of $2.9 million in the US requires = 0:394. As shown in Figure 2 , in this case ratio (y; ) is decreasing, particularly for countries with income per-capita below $5,000. The decreasing pattern is explained because in the calibration is su¢ ciently larger than , satisfying the corresponding condition in part (iv), Proposition 2. The ratio (y; ) is particularly large for countries with short life expectancy. The average life expectancy in our sample is 67 years, with a minimum of 41 years. Almost all countries with life spans below 67 years also have income per-capita below $5,000. When > 1 > , a lifetime as short as 41 years, or less than 67 years, makes life specially valuable. Such prediction cannot be generated by the EU model regardless of the values of and c. Finally, going back to the case of India, the calibration of EZW utility with = 1:01 implies a VSL of $175,443, which increases to $184,750 for the case of = 1:25, around two and a half times the VSL with EU.
We now turn to calculate full measures of income that take into account both the quality and quantity of life.
Full income and welfare
We now use the EU and EZW models to compute welfare measures over time and across countries. 
while in the EU model, according to equation (3), it is given by V EU (y; ; c) = 1 1
Let V 0 V (y 0 ; 0 ) be the welfare in a benchmark situation and V i V (y i ; i ) the welfare in another situation i. For welfare measures across time, or growth calculations, the subscripts 0 and i refer to two di¤erent years for a given country, while for cross-country comparisons they refer to two di¤erent countries in a given year.
The typical measure of proportional welfare di¤erences between these situations is the per-capita income ratio R i = y i =y 0 . We now de…ne a more comprehensive ratio of incomes that includes an imputed value for di¤erences in life expectancy. We denote this ratio R f i where f stands for "full" income ratio which is de…ned implicitly by
Thus R f i is the proportional change in y 0 required to equate welfare in both situations. Notice that R f i = R i if 0 = i ; and R f i 7 R i if i 7 0 and y i > c. R f i for the EU and EZW utility cases can be easily obtained using (28) 
and
The solution for the EU case (30) is a CES function of the relative consumptions in the living and dead states with a weight, (1 0 ) = (1 i ), that measures the relative change in "e¤ective mortality rates." The larger the reduction in mortality, the higher the weight assigned to the living state. Moreover, the lower the , the more substitution there is, and the larger the value imputed to mortality changes. Table 2 reports the levels of full and per-capita incomes for countries at selected percentiles of the income distribution in 2005. In all reported countries, life expectancy increased between 1970 and 2005. Full incomes, which include these gains in life expectancy, are larger than per-capita incomes under both EU and EZW. The di¤erences between full and per-capita incomes are larger for countries below the 50th percentile, as suggested by the annual growth rates. For instance, in Rwanda (10th percentile), the annual growth rate of per-capita income between 1970 to 2005 is 0.18%, while the corresponding growth rates of full income are 0.23% under EU and 0.50% under EZW. In Nigeria (25th percentile), the corresponding …gures are 0.31%, 0.51% and 0.94%. Even at the 50th percentile (Guatemala), the respective annual growth rates are 0.94%, 1.53% and 1.86%.
In contrast, for Hungary (75th percentile) and the US (98th percentile) the di¤erences in annual growth rates are minimal. Table 2 con…rms the …nding that gains in life expectancy in poorer countries imply proportionally larger full income measures with EZW than with EU.
Insert Table 2 around here
For welfare calculations across countries, we label the US as 0 and each of the other countries as i in equations (30) 
Insert Figure 4 around here
As seen in Figure 4 , the EZW model predicts that the low life expectancy in poor countries unambiguously reduces welfare by a large amount. For instance, according to the EZW model, a lifetime as short as 40 to 50 years reduces welfare by 40 to 50%. In contrast, under the EU model welfare is reduced by no more than 25%, or even increased by 20%, depending on the country's income level. Speci…cally, welfare increases when life expectancy is low and per capita income is below the calibrated minimum consumption. Table 3 con…rms that when per-capita income is adjusted to re ‡ect the gaps in life expectancy relative to the US, the cross-sectional dispersion of adjusted income is larger under EZW preferences. while adjusted income is $902. As seen in Table 3 , the di¤erences between per-capita and adjusted incomes are smaller for countries beyond the 50th percentile. Last, while the standard deviation of the log of per-capita income in 2005 is 0.61, that of adjusted income with EZW preferences is 0.68.
Cross-country welfare inequality is larger than income di¤erences.
Insert Table 3 around here
Wars and AIDS
The analysis above suggests that the EZW model signi…cantly reassesses the economic consequences of major events a¤ecting longevity such as the end of wars or the AIDS pandemic. Table 4 compares the predictions of the EU and EZW models for selected countries. We compute welfare across time using equations (30) and (31) Insert Table 4 around here Consider now countries that lost years of life, mostly due to AIDS: Central Africa (3.2 years), South Africa (9.6), Botswana (13.3) and Zimbabwe (19.3) . Both Central Africa and Zimbabwe experienced declines in years of life and per-capita income of 26 and 30% respectively. Table 4 indicates that the EZW model penalizes these shorter life spans much more than the EU model. For Zimbabwe, full income under EU dropped by 16%, less than the 30% drop in per-capita income, implying that 19.3 less years of life are welfare improving! In contrast, according to the EZW model Zimbabwe's full income sharply dropped, by 56%. Table 4 shows that the EZW model predicts substantial welfare costs of AIDS in Africa.
The value of life over the life cycle
In this section we explore the quantitative predictions of our benchmark model for the value of life over the life cycle. We now allow for age-dependent survival and leisure. Murphy and Topel (2006) computed the life-cycle pro…le of the VSL for the US using an EU model. In order to provide the cleanest comparison between the EU and EZW models, we replicate Murphy and Topel as much as possible, and calibrate the EZW using the same targets so that the only di¤erences between the models can be traced to the GMAP. 24 Assume that composite consumption z t is represented by the following CES function
where is the weight of leisure in composite consumption, and is the elasticity of substitution between consumption c t and leisure l t . Although Murphy and Topel do not explicitly write the functional form of z t in their paper, they indicate assuming a constant elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure. Table 5 summarizes the calibration of the life-cycle model. We follow Murphy and Topel by exogenously setting = 1:25 and = 0:5. The total number of available hours, work plus leisure, is set to 4; 000 a year. We use the US life tables from the 2000 National Vital Statistics Report to compute t , which is the probability of surviving to age t + 1 conditional on having survived to age t. Hourly wages over the life cycle w t are computed using data from the 2000 US Census.
Calibration
The sample is restricted to full-time working males between the ages of 20 and 64. The Census also provides information about yearly wage earnings and hours worked, both of which we use to inform our quantitative exercise. A fourth-degree polynomial in age is estimated to generate the wage pro…le. As in Murphy and Topel we assume bene…ts represent 29% of hourly wages, and life-contingent non-wage income b t for ages 65 and higher is 50% of the wage earnings at age 64.
Retirement is assumed to occur exogenously at age 65.
Insert Table 5 around here
We calibrate parameters and r, and the H t pro…le so that both the EU and EZW models replicate the same consumption and leisure pro…les in Murphy and Topel. This results in common and r for both models, while H t pro…les di¤er. is calibrated so that the ratio of consumption at age 50 to age 20 is 1.29, which yields = 0:029. In addition, r is calibrated so that both consumption and income of the average working male equal $52,493 at age 50, which results in r = 3:38%. 25 Last, the health index H t is calibrated so that annual consumption growth after age 50 is 2%.
In addition to the H t pro…le, the main di¤erence between the EU and the EZW models is the calibration of z in the former, and in the latter. In the EU model z is calibrated to match an average VSL between ages 25 and 55 of $6.3 million. This is achieved by setting z so that 
in order to replicate the same realistic hump shape for consumption as in Murphy and Topel. 26 By having both models replicate exactly the same consumption and leisure allocations, we ensure that the di¤erences in the VSL reported below arise exclusively from di¤erences in the GMAP.
Insert Figure 5 around here Health indexes in Figure 5 are roughly constant until about age 35, when they start declining gradually up to age 70, and faster thereafter. The calibrated H t declines faster in the EZW model.
The reason is that under the calibrated EZW preferences, individuals are more patient, which would imply faster consumption growth than in the EU case. In order for both models to replicate the same consumption growth, H t must be falling faster in the EZW case. We follow Murphy and Topel's calibration of H t since our only purpose here is to compare the predictions of EU and EZW utility. 27 Notice that the life-cycle calibration for the US and the cross-country calibration in Section 4.1 both imply is well below one, so that the restriction of < 1 is not binding. Recall also that
for the perpetual youth model we chose a target of $2.9 million for the VSL to keep the exercise comparable with Becker et al. (2005) , while for the life-cycle model the target is an average VSL of $6.3 million for ages 25 to 55 as in Murphy and Topel. Yet we continue to obtain < 1. In fact, had we calibrated the cross-country perpetual youth model to match a VSL of $6.3 million in the US with = 1:25, we would have obtained = 0:662, very close to the calibration in this section.
The value of life
We now describe the life-cycle pro…le of the VSL implied by the calibrated EU and EZW models. Figure 6 portrays the VSL over the life cycle under EU and EZW utility. Pro…les are drawn for an individual with average wage earnings, and for a low-income individual whose wage income over the life cycle is 50% of the average. The VSL in the …gure corresponds to the value of "remaining life"
at each age, as represented in equation (19), where the value of a life-year with EZW utility is given by (20) and that with EU by (21). Several patterns deserve comment. First, for the average-wage individual, the VSL is similar in both models, although the pro…les cross twice over the life cycle.
Speci…cally, the VSL is higher before age 40 and after age 80 under EZW preferences. The reason for this can be traced back to the GMAP in Proposition 1. Given that both models replicate the same allocations, the only di¤erence in the values of a life-year according to equations (20) and (21) is the GMAP. While the GMAP is constant over the life cycle in the EZW case, it varies with age in the EU case depending on the ratio z=z t . As shown in Figure 7 , the calibrated GMAP with EZW utility is constant and equal to 1=(1 ) = 3:17, regardless of the individual's age. In contrast,
according to the EU model the GMAP for the individual with average wage earnings is lower than 3.17 before age 65; then it jumps to a higher value upon retirement, and then it falls below 3.17 around age 85. The jump in the GMAP at age 65 is due to the jump of composite consumption upon retirement induced by increased leisure. It is the relatively low GMAP at the beginning and at the end of life what lowers the VSL under EU for the average individual at those ages.
Insert Figure 6 around here
The pattern changes for the case of the low-income individual: the VSL is signi…cantly higher under EZW preferences than under EU. In this case, as Figure 7 shows, the GMAP is always lower with EU than with EZW utility. Low-income individuals have a lower level of composite consumption z t over their whole life cycle, which for given z results in a lower GMAP in the EU
case. An alternative way of seeing the di¤erent implications of the model is to compute the ratio of the VSL under EZW utility relative to EU from Figure 6 . For the low-income individual this ratio is always above one: around 1.3 at younger ages, and rising to 1.8 at older ages. In contrast,
for the individual with average earnings, this ratio is slightly above one before age 40, below one between ages 40 and 80, and goes up to almost 1.2 after age 80. In a nutshell, the introduction of a minimum level of consumption z in the EU model has important implications for the age-pro…le of the VSL among individuals with di¤erent income levels. Table 1 . Figure 8 portrays the VSL in the EZW relative to the EU model for each . 28 The …gure con…rms that even when V > 0 the VSL under EZW preferences is larger than (the absolute value) under EU, particularly for poorer countries.
Insert Figure 8 around here
There are two other points to notice in Figure 8 . First, for = 1:25, a commonly used value in macro, the di¤erences between the EZW and the EU models are the largest, in part because the EU model requires a larger c in order to match a given VSL, rendering the VSL negative for any country with per-capita income below $4; 750 (the sample median is $5; 367). This illustrates once more the quantitative pitfalls in the EU model. Second, notice that even if with V > 0 the restriction 2 (0; 1) is not binding, it turns out that < 1 in all calibrations. The data clearly supports < 1.
Ordering degrees of risk aversion
Bommier (2014) argues that while the risk-sensitive preferences of Hansen and Sargent (1995) are well ordered in terms of risk aversion, this is not the case for EZW preferences. In particular, parameter may not order preferences in terms of degrees of risk aversion. While this is generally true, it turns out that our EZW speci…cation with V = 0 is not subject to this limitation. This can be shown analytically in the simple perpetual youth model of Section 3.2.2.
Proposition 3. Consider a perpetual youth model in which t = ; = 1, H t = 1, b t = 0, w t = w, l t = 0, z t = c t , y t = y, a 0 = 0 and r( ) = ( )=(1 ) = 1 so that consumption is constant over time and equal to income c t = y. Then in the EZW model with V = 0 parameter orders preferences in terms of risk aversion.
Proof Given c t = y for all t, forward iteration on lifetime utility (9) yields 
If the individual is averse to mortality risk, then he must be better o¤ by receiving the average consumption E 0 c t = t c at each t for certain, rather than facing the life-or-death lottery. Notice that in computing E 0 c t we are taking into account that the consumption equivalent of death is zero. Consider the lifetime utility of receiving E 0 c t in period t, alive or dead. Denote such utility V (Ec). Then
then mortality risk neutrality requires = 0; mortality risk aversion (h( ; ) < 1) requires > 0 and mortality risk loving requires < 0: Finally, the larger the the higher the degree of mortality risk aversion. Thus, parameter orders preferences in terms of risk aversion. k
The result that EZW preferences with V = 0 can properly rank life-or-death lotteries is novel.
Most applications of EZW preferences are for …nancial markets, particularly asset pricing, where lotteries are of a di¤erent nature. The life-or-death lottery is special because when the imputed utility on the dead state is normalized to zero, only the utility in the living state enters explicitly in the representation. If V > 0, then the EZW representation of the life-or-death lottery becomes similar to the ones of standard …nancial economics. In this case parameter does not always order preferences in terms of risk aversion. Since our EZW utility is positive, setting V = 0 is a natural normalization as long as 0 < < 1. Our calibrations above indicate that this restriction is not binding.
Consumption versus mortality risk
The calibration exercises across countries and over the life cycle imply a preference for late resolution of mortality uncertainty. In contrast, asset market evidence from the …nancial literature, such as the equity premium puzzle, suggests a preference for early resolution of …nancial uncertainty. 29 We can reconcile this seemingly con ‡icting evidence with an extension of our model that allows individuals to di¤erentiate mortality risk from other types of consumption risks. ; which collapses to the standard EU when = = . The representation above is ‡exible enough to accommodate a preference for the timing of uncertainty resolution for both mortality and unemployment risk. Speci…cally, it can simultaneously allow for: (i) > or preference for late resolution of mortality risk, as consistent with our calibration above; and (ii) > to capture a preference for early resolution of unemployment (…nancial) risk. In sum, if > > 1 > > 0 then we have a framework in which a preference for early resolution of unemployment risk coexists with a preference for late resolution of mortality risk. Our paper can be viewed as one in which there is no …nancial (unemployment) risk and therefore plays no role.
Alternative formulations of expected utility
Our discussion of EU uses the popular constant relative risk aversion utility function. We now explore whether other utility functions alter the characterization of EU presented above. Two alternative utility functions appear to change the prediction that the VSL is negative for poorer countries. First, suppose utility is a function of both market and non-market consumption. For instance, assume that utility is given by (c + !) 1 =(1 ), where ! > 0 is the non-market consumption. In this case, the value of life could still be positive at low levels of consumption thanks to the presence of ! > 0. Although this is certainly possible, we still …nd in various numerical exercises that ! would have to be sizable in order to obtain a reasonable calibration for the VSL, in the order to 65 to 95% of total consumption (c + !) in poorer countries. Even if one is willing to accept that non-market consumption is a large fraction of total consumption in poorer countries, this speci…cation would still imply that the VSL-to-income ratio is increasing in income, and that individuals are indi¤erent to the timing of resolution of death uncertainty. for c ! where a = ! . The formula above guarantees that the function is continuous and di¤erentiable, and that marginal utility does not jump at threshold level !. In addition, assume that ! c so that at least some, if not all, individuals below the threshold ! would prefer to be alive. Notice that it is still true that individuals with c < c would prefer to die. The linearity of utility at levels of consumption below ! implies that it is now possible to choose lower values of c without making the VSL very high. In other words, in the absence of concavity at low levels of consumption, the increase in marginal utility upon death is not as pronounced as when utility is concave. One would hope that by selecting an appropriate value for !, one could obtain a calibration in which c < c for all countries so that the VSL is always positive, while keeping the VSL in the US within a reasonable range. This is indeed possible, but only with values in the upper range of existing estimates of the VSL in the US. Moreover, as in the case of non-market consumption, this threshold model still implies that the VSL-to-income ratio is increasing in income, and that individuals are indi¤erent to the timing of resolution of death uncertainty.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Our analysis makes the case for relaxing state separability of preferences when studying health and longevity issues. We discuss the case of EZW utility, a popular class of tractable functions that had found applications in the macro-…nance literature, but has not been studied in the case of mortality. Expanding the set of state non-separable utility functions to analyze mortality risk is a promising research avenue.
Our quantitative exercises …nd that the parameters governing mortality aversion and intertemporal substitution are di¤erent. This appears to be a robust result, since it was obtained from calibrations that are distinct in many respects. According to the estimated parameters, individuals exhibit a preference for late resolution of death uncertainty and a decreasing marginal utility of survival. The added ‡exibility of EZW preferences is not limited to its better ability to match the evidence on the value of life. It also provides a di¤erent perspective on the behavioral aspects of preferences over life and death, and new insights that may change the policy implications of longevity models.
We document important quantitative di¤erences between the EZW and EU models, particularly in terms of how the value of life changes with income, survival and age. Such di¤erences matter when assessing the potential economic bene…ts of health interventions targeting speci…c groups such as the elderly or the poor. Moreover, our model can help rationalize the observed trends in health expenditures as population ages or the sizeable expenditures at the end of life. Finally, our model has implications for the analysis of health inequality within a country. The EZW model implies that health programs targeted at raising life expectancy of the poor may deliver signi…cant welfare gains, much above those predicted under EU. We leave these questions for future work.
